Competition Between Regulation-Providing and Fixed-Power Charging
  Stations for Electric Vehicles by Shuai, Wenjing et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
4.
04
57
9v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
5 A
pr
 20
16
Competition Between Regulation-Providing and
Fixed-Power Charging Stations for Electric Vehicles
Wenjing Shuai, Patrick Maille´, Alexander Pelov
Institut Mines-Telecom/Telecom Bretagne
Abstract— This paper models a non-cooperative game between
two EV charging stations. One is a fixed-power charging station
purchasing electricity from the grid at wholesale price and
reselling the energy to EV owners at a higher retail price; the
other is regulation-providing and varies the recharging power
level of its clients to provide regulation services to the grid, so
its profit comes from both EV owners (who buy energy) and the
grid (which pays for regulation services). Users are reluctant to
charging power variations and prefer shorter overall charging
times, hence regulation-providing charging has to be cheaper
than fixed-power charging.
We analyze the competition among those charging providers,
and examine the performance at the equilibrium in terms of
user welfare, station revenue and electricity prices. As expected,
competing stations provide users with lower charging prices than
when both charging solutions are offered by a monopolistic
provider. Moreover, while competition benefits users, it also
benefits the grid in that the amount of regulation services
increases significantly with respect to the monopolistic case.
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the main difficulties of the penetration of Electric
Vehicles (EVs) in the smart city is the associated energy equa-
tion: how can the power grid accommodate the corresponding
demand? [1]. And together with the technical limitations, the
question of economic incentives to elicit the most efficient
use of resources needs also to be considered (see [2] and
references therein). But EVs do not use the energy in real
time, they just store it in their batteries until leaving the
charging station. This particularity of EV charging demand
can be leveraged, in particular for regulation purposes, i.e., by
adapting the consumption at a very fast pace (within seconds)
to the current energy production and consumption state of the
grid. In practice, when there is extra (resp. a lack of) energy
production with respect to demand, the grid can send a “down”
(resp., “up”) regulation signal so that the production side–or
here, the consumption side–reacts accordingly. In this paper,
we consider the economic aspects of such an option, from the
point of view of EV owners and charging stations.
Previous work focuses on fairness issues among users in
terms of final state-of-charge [3]; on incentivizing EV owners
to contribute to regulation [4], [5]; or on the resulting user
welfare [6], [7]. The closest works to ours are [8], [9], where
the focus is on the pricing strategies of the charging stations:
in [8], Gao et al. consider a regulator designing contracts
to incentivize EVs to participate so that the station profit
is maximized. On the other hand, in [9] we considered a
charging station offering two simple options, namely a fixed-
power charging (no regulation) and a varying-power charging
(following regulation signals). Another difference is that [8]
allows vehicle-to-grid energy exchanges while in [9] the
regulation services are just provided by varying the current
charging power. But both of those works, as well as [10],
assume a monopolistic revenue-maximizing charging station.
In this paper, we focus on the effect of competition, by
considering two competing charging stations, one implement-
ing only regulation-based charging and the other only fixed-
power charging. When compared to monopolistic situations,
we expect competition to benefit to users, through lower
recharging prices. But also, we investigate the viability of each
competitor: indeed, regulation is rewarded through financial
incentives, and providing regulation during charging may not
yield sufficient revenues if those incentives are not large
enough. Hence some regions of reward values where EV-
charging-based regulation can occur; this was investigated in
the monopolistic case in [9], here we study the effect of
competition on that aspect as well.
Our results indicate that, as expected, competition is ben-
eficial to users, through lower recharging prices. Also, com-
petition appears to be better from the grid perspective, since
both the region of rewards for which regulation is viable and
the amount of regulation offered are larger in the competition
setting. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II presents our model; Section III analyzes the price
competition and the resulting Nash equilibrium; In Section IV
we compare the performance of the competition with the
monopolistic case and Section V concludes the paper.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
According to a national household travel survey of the
United States [11], [12], a passenger vehicle spends on average
75 minutes a day on journey, hence is parked most of the time.
We assume this to remain true for EVs, i.e., the time during
which they are available for charging largely exceeds that
needed to fully recharge their batteries. So this is interesting, at
least for some EV drivers, to accept longer charging durations
for cheaper energy. This opens an opportunity for charging
stations to increase revenue through the rewards offered to
regulation-contributing entities, as well as for EV owners to
save on their energy bill.
Conventional recharging services are provided by what we
will call an S-charging station, purchasing electricity at the low
wholesale unit price te/kWh and reselling it to EV owners
at a higher price; whereas in a R-charging, charging power
is not guaranteed but subject to variations over time, as a
response to regulation requests issued by grid operators. We
model the interactions among both stations (or sets of stations,
each set controlled by a separate entity) as a noncooperative
game since they compete over prices to attract EV owners.
User preferences between price and charging power variations
are assumed heterogeneous, so each station seeks the best
tradeoff between market shares and per-client profit in order
to maximize its expected revenue.
A. Regulation mechanism
Frequency regulation, depending on the response time, is
mainly divided into: primary, secondary, and tertiary control,
with the response time increasing from seconds, to minutes
and finally to half an hour respectively [13]. In our proposal,
the R-charging station modulates the EV charging power to
provide the secondary control: one regulation time slot lasts
for ∆ hours, with ∆ typically between 0.1 (6 minutes) and
0.25 (15 minutes). Periodically, the grid operator, buyer of the
regulation service, sends a regulation request to the R-charging
station specifying its demand, which can be regulation-up, -
down or -null. Receiving the signal, the R-charging station
sets the EV recharging power to be 0 kW1, Pd kW, or Pn
kW respectively: Pd is the maximum acceptable power level
allowed by the EV supply equipment in the station, and Pn is
the default recharging power (0 ≤ Pn ≤ Pd) defined by the R-
charging station itself, when no regulation is needed, namely
regulation null. Note that this mechanism increases (decreases)
the EV consumption responding to regulation-down (-up). This
counter-intuitive naming stems from conventional regulation
services, where providers are generation units whereas the task
is given to consumers here. For later convenience we will use
the notation x := Pn
Pd
, so that x ∈ [0, 1].
At the S-charging station, EVs are always charged at full
speed Pd kW. Figure 1 illustrates the charging power profiles
for the two stations as well as the energy accumulated in an
EV battery being charged for a given scenario of regulation
requests. We denote by CB the energy demand of an EV,
and by ρu (ρd) the probability of occurrence of regulation-
up (-down) at each time slot, those signals being assumed
independent at each regulation period in this paper.
There may be concerns that varying the charging power for
all EVs in R-charging station(s) simultaneously and drastically
following this “ping-pong” policy can lead to an oversupply
of regulation, i.e., the aggregated increase or decrease in
power is larger than that actually needed by the grid operator.
This is hardly possible since in the scale of a grid operator,
the disposable regulation capacity scattered in EVs is non-
dominant if not negligible given the current penetration levels.
For example data from RTE (Re´seau de transport d’electricite´),
the biggest independent system operator in France, show that
the regulation-down demand in 30 minutes2 can easily go over
100 MWh, a quantity that could only be absorbed by at least
ten thousand EVs doing level 2 recharging (19.2kW [14]) at
1We do not allow here EVs to deliver energy to the grid (the so-called
vehicle-to-grid transfer).
2http://clients.rte-france.com/lang/fr/visiteurs/vie/mecanisme/jour/volume.jsp
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Fig. 1: Power and cumulated energy an EV obtained with and
without regulation (simulation with CB =50kWh, Pd =20kW,
Pn =16kW, ∆ =0.1hour, ρu = ρd =0.45 [9])
the same time. Since the whole country has an EV population
of 30 thousand, sharing 8600 public charging facilities, the
regulation oversupply problem is not of concern so far.
B. Regulation incentives
In return for providing regulation, the R-charging station
receives monetary incentives, with respect to the default
wholesale price t.
• In regulation-null periods, it charges each plugged EV
with power Pn kW, and pays ∆tPn monetary units (no
compensation) over such a duration-∆;
• in regulation-up periods, the grid operator “re-buys” the
energy saved at a unit price rut, hence the station pays
∆t(1 − ru)Pn monetary units over such a period (note
that we can expect to have ru ≥ 1, although it is not
always the case in practice);
• similarly, in a regulation-down, the R-charging station
pays for the extra energy it consumes at a discount price
t(1− rd) monetary units per kWh, thus a total price paid
∆
(
Pnt+ (Pd − Pn)t(1 − rd)
)
monetary units per EV.
Together with the probabilities of regulation-up (ρu) and down(ρd), the expected net revenue (possibly negative) over one
regulation slot is:
E∆ = t∆(ρuruPn − ρd(1 − rd)(Pd − Pn) − Pn) (1)
C. User preferences
We assume that each EV owner needs CB kWh of energy,
say, per day, the owner can choose to charge at the constant
power Pd in the S-charging station, or to charge at a variable
power in the R-charging station. They can also choose neither
solution (a no charging choice) if they consider both too
expensive. Naturally, users are assumed to:
• prefer to recharge faster, i.e., at higher power rate;
• be reluctant to uncertainty in the recharging power caused
by regulations. Additionally, batteries can be sensitive
to power variations in the recharging process, another
reason for EV owners to be reluctant to contributing to
regulation.
Following these criteria, we define the user utility
(willingness-to-pay minus price paid) for a recharging option
as being of the form
V = θ(P¯ − γδ(P )) − TCB
where P¯ is the expected charging power, and δ(P ) its standard
deviation. θ is user-specific: we assume it to be exponentially
distributed, with mean θ¯, over the EV owner population. The
parameter γ is the reluctance toward power fluctuations, and
is assumed the same for all users. Finally, T represents the
unit energy price set by the charging station chosen by the
user. (We take T = 0 for users who choose no charging).
Let us define PA as the value of P¯ − γδ(P ) for the R-
charging option, which can easily be expressed from Pd, Pn,
ρd and ρu. The parameter (γ) we choose always guarantees
PA ≥ 0 which means that this proposal does not target users
with a too high sensitivity to power fluctuation. The probability
αr (resp., αs) that a user chooses the R-charging (resp., S-
charging) station can then be expressed as
αr =


1 − exp(−
CB (Ts−Tr)
θ¯(Pd−PA)
) if Tr < 0
exp(−
CBTr
θ¯PA
) − exp(−
CB(Ts−Tr)
θ¯(Pd−PA)
) if 0 ≤ Tr ≤
PA
Pd
Ts
0 otherwise
αs =


exp(−
CBTs
θ¯Pd
) if Ts ≤
Pd
PA
Tr
exp(−
CB(Ts−Tr)
θ¯(Pd−PA)
) otherwise.
(2)
(3)
Note that we allow negative charging prices with the R-
charging station: indeed, since that station can make money
from the grid thanks to EV owners, the corresponding rewards
could be so large that the station would be willing to attract a
large number of EVs, even by paying them. This case is for
completeness of the model, we think it is not very likely to
occur but we cover it in this paper.
Following the classical backward induction method, we first
assume Pn (or equivalently x) fixed and analyze the pricing
game (defined bellow). The outcome is dependent on x so the
R-charging station can maximize its profit through altering its
value. We examine the first part analytically while the second
numerically due to complexity.
Definition II.1. The pricing game between the S-charging sta-
tion and the R-charging station as a collection: 〈N , T , (Ri)〉,
where the player set N consists of the two stations, the price
profile T is a vector (Ts, Tr) on the semi-plane R≥0×R, and
the payoff function Ri : T → R gives each station’s expected
revenue obtained from one EV.
Table I summarizes the notations used in our model.
TABLE I: Model notations
t unit price of energy paid by stations (unit: e/kWh)
ru remuneration ratio for regulation-up (no unit)
rd discount ratio for regulation-down (no unit)
ρu (resp. ρd) probability of an “up” (resp. “down”) regulation signal
CB average energy recharged per EV per day
θ user sensitivity to recharging power (including variabil-
ity)
θ¯ average value of θ among users
γ user reluctance to power variation
Pn (resp. Pd) default (resp. “regulation-down”) recharging power
x Pn
Pd
P¯ ρdPd + (1− ρu − ρd)Pn
δ(P )
√
ρuP¯ 2 + ρd(Pd − P¯ )2 + (1− ρu − ρd)(Pn − P¯ )2)
PA(x), or PA P¯ − γδ(P ) ( > 0 )
III. ANALYSIS OF THE GAME
In this section, we analyze the non-cooperative strategic
game defined in II.1. We derive their respective best-response
prices, to characterize the Nash equilibria.
A. Best-response prices
1) S-charging station revenue and best-response price T brs :
For the S-charging station owner, its average income Rs
depends on the market share αs, and the unit price Ts it offers:
Rs = CB(Ts − t)αs =


CB(Ts − t) exp(−
CBTs
θ¯Pd
) Ts ≤
Pd
PA
Tr
CB(Ts − t) exp(−
CB(Ts − Tr)
θ¯(Pd − PA)
) Ts >
Pd
PA
Tr.
(4a)
(4b)
Depending on its opponent’s strategy Tr, the price Ts that
maximizes Rs provides the best-response price.
Proposition III.1. The S-charging station has a unique best-
response price as follows:
Tbrs (Tr) =


t + (Pd − PA)
θ¯
CB
if Tr < (t + (Pd − PA)
θ¯
CB
)
PA
Pd
t + Pd
θ¯
CB
if Tr > (t + Pd
θ¯
CB
)
PA
Pd
Tr
Pd
PA
otherwise
(5a)
(5b)
(5c)
Proof in Appendix A.
Figure 2 illustrates the S-charging station revenue as a
function of Tr, and the best-response T brs (Tr).
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Fig. 2: S-charging station revenue as a function of Tr and Ts
(t = 0.03, θ¯ = 0.3, CB = 50kWh, x = 0.8). The red, yellow
and blue areas are separated by Tr = (t+ (Pd − PA) θ¯CB )
PA
Pd
and Tr = (t+ Pd θ¯CB )
PA
Pd
, referring to (5).
2) R-charging station revenue and best-response price
T brr (Ts): Let us now consider the R-charging station owner,
having to decide its price Tr.
To estimate how much net renumeration the R-charging
station gets from recharging EVs through regulation, we
multiply the regulation revenue per slot, i.e. E∆ in (1), by
the average number of slots a regulating EV remains plugged-
in before its battery is fully recharged, i.e. CB/(∆P¯ ). To
facilitate the writing we further divide the product, which has
a unit of e, by the EV energy demand (CB kWh), so that its
final unit is e/kWh and has a form of
Er := t(ρurux − ρd(1 − rd)(1 − x) − x)
Pd
P¯
.
The average R-charging station revenue consists of renu-
meration from providing regulation and income from charging
EVs:
Rr =


CB (Tr + Er)[1 − exp(−
CB (Ts−Tr)
θ¯(Pd−PA)
)] Tr < 0
CB (Tr + Er)[exp(−
CBTr
θ¯PA
) − exp(−
CB(Ts−Tr)
θ¯(Pd−PA)
)] 0 ≤ Tr ≤
PA
Pd
Ts
0 otherwise
(6)
The following result summarizes the optimal R-charging
station reaction to its competitor.
Proposition III.2. The R-charging station has a unique best-
response price as follows:
Tbrr (Ts) =


Ts
PA
Pd
if Ts ≤ −Er
Pd
PA
0 if Ts ∈ {Ts : Er,1(Ts) ≤ Er ≤ Er,2(Ts)}
{Tr ∈ R :
∂Rr
∂Tr
= 0}
⊂
(
min{0,−Er},max{0,min{
θ¯PA
CB
− Er,
PA
Pd
Ts}}
)
otherwise
(7a)
(7b)
(7c)
where
Er,1(Ts) =
θ¯(Pd − PA)
(
1− exp(−
CBTs
θ¯(Pd−PA)
)
)
CB
( Pd
PA
− 1 + exp(
CBTs
θ¯(Pd−PA)
)
)
Er,2(Ts) = Er,1(Ts)
(
1 + (
Pd
PA
− 1) exp(
CBTs
θ¯(Pd − PA)
)
)
.
Proof in Appendix B.
Figure 3 shows the R-charging station revenue as well as
the best-response price T brr (Ts), as a function of Ts.
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Fig. 3: R-charging Station revenue as a function of Tr and
Ts (t = 0.03, rd = 0.7, ru = 2.1, CB = 50kWh, ρd =
0.48, ρu = 0.48, γ = 0.05, θ¯ = 0.3, x = 0.8). Red region
corresponds to non-negative revenue, i.e. Tr
PA
< Ts
Pd
B. Nash equilibrium
Proposition III.3. The pricing game defined in II.1 has either
a unique Nash equilibrium or a unique Pareto-dominant one
when there exist infinite number of Nash equilibria. The
equilibria prices in different circumstances are:
NE :


Tr = −Er ; Ts = −
Pd
PA
Er
if Er ≤ −
PA
Pd
[t+ (Pd − PA)
θ¯
CB
]
Tr ∈ (0,min{
θPA
CB
− Er,
PA
Pd
Ts)}; Ts = t + (Pd − PA)
θ¯
CB
if −
PA
Pd
[t+ (Pd − PA)
θ¯
CB
] < Er < Er,1
(
t+ (Pd − PA)
θ¯
CB
)
Tr = 0; Ts = t + (Pd − PA)
θ¯
CB
if Er,1
(
t + (Pd − PA)
θ¯
CB
)
≤ Er ≤ Er,2
(
t + (Pd − PA)
θ¯
CB
)
Tr ∈ (−Er, 0); Ts = t + (Pd − PA)
θ¯
CB
if Er,2
(
t + (Pd − PA)
θ¯
CB
)
< Er
(8a)
(8b)
(8c)
(8d)
Proof in Appendix C.
Note that NE(8a) which occurs when Er ≤ −PAPd [t+(Pd−
PA)
θ
CB
] is not profitable for the R-charging stations since zero
revenue is obtained, and that the condition for a positive R-
charging station revenue is −PA
Pd
[t+(Pd−PA)
θ
CB
] < Er. We
will refer to this condition in Section IV-B.
Figure 4 illustrates best-response prices and resulting Nash
equilibria in four different circumstances.
1) Optimization of Pn: The pricing game defined in II.1 is
played given a fixed Pn, set by the R-charging station, who
can afterwards modify its value to pursue a higher equilibrium
revenue. Due to the complexity of the equilibrium price profile
we resort to numerical search for the optimal Pn.
IV. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND
THE MONOPOLISTIC CASE
In this section we compare the competition model with the
monopolistic case where a single manager sets both the S-
charging price as well as the R-charging price to maximize
its overall revenue. We do not repeat the results in [9] for the
monopolistic case due to space limit, but simply compare their
performances under the same parameters.
A. User welfare
User welfare is the average user utility over the distribution
of user preference parameter, i.e. θ. The following formula
works for both the monopolistic case and the Nash equilib-
rium.
U =
∫ (Ts−Tr)CB
Pd−PA
TrCB
PA
(θPA − TrCB)
1
θ¯
exp(−
θ
θ¯
)dθ
+
∫ +∞
(Ts−Tr)CB
Pd−PA
(θPd − TsCB )
1
θ¯
exp(−
θ
θ¯
)dθ
=αrθ¯PA + αsθ¯Pd
The first column in Figure 5 shows a significant increase
of user welfare (UM for monopoly and UE for equilibrium)
after breaking a monopolistic station into two competing ones.
Although the total station revenue decrease, the social welfare
which is the user utility plus station revenue has a net increase
of over 20%. The second column illustrate an increase of EVs
being served, thanks to a decrease of energy prices depicted
in the third column.
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Fig. 5: Comparison between Monopoly (first row) and Nash equilibrium (second row), with t = 0.03, θ¯ = 0.3, CB = 50,
ρd = ρu = 0.48, γ = 0.05, rd = 0.4, ru = 1.6 (rd and ru are the daily average of 20/07/2015).
B. Application in a real world market
Figure 6 compares the regions for rewards {rd, ru} where
offering R-charging is profitable. At equilibria (second row),
the black zones where R-charging is not preferred is remark-
ably smaller than those in the monopolistic case. This is be-
cause that in a monopoly, feasible region for rewards {rd, ru}
is composed of those that make the following equation of x
solvable in the interval of [0, 1] [9]:
ρurux − ρd(1 − rd)(1 − x) − x− P¯(x)PA(x)P
−2
d
> 0
Whereas in competition, (8a) and (8b) give the condition of:
t(ρurux− ρd(1 − rd)(1 − x) − x − P¯PAP
−2
d
)
+
1
t
P¯PAP
−2
d
[Pd − PA]
θ¯
CB
> 0
Comparing these two we find that the competition enlarges the
viable region of {rd, ru}. The blue and red areas in Figure 6
are referring to the optimal default recharging power Pn in
these regions, i.e. the optimal x after exhaustive search. In
most combinations of {rd, ru}, this optimal x is either 0 or
1, except for a few {rd, ru} observed in the gap between the
blue region and the red, in the figures on the third column
where average user preference on power is smaller: θ¯ = 0.1
and user sensitivity to variation is greater: γ = 0.5. We also
plot the actual {rd, ru} offered by a French operator RTE on
these figures. The blue circles correspond to the 48 {rd, ru}
pairs on the day of 20/07/2015 and the red rectangles are
showing the daily averages during the week from 20/07/2015
to 26/07/2015.
V. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVE
This paper considers a competition between two self-
interested charging stations. At the Nash equilibrium of this
non-cooperative game, both stations tends to offered lower
prices to EV owners than a monopolistic controller would do,
thus more clients are attracted and greater regulation services
is provided to the grid operator. This work can be extended in
several ways including: bring in more actors such as charging
stations with private renewable energy sources; considering the
actor of a “Grid” who can play with the wholesale electricity
price imposed on both R-charging and S-charging station; or
differentiate two charging stations by their locations, which
effect users’ preferences among them.
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APPENDIX A
Proof:
The function (4) is continuous in Ts, and is differentiable
over the intervals (−∞, Pd
PA
Tr) and ( PdPA Tr,+∞), with partial
derivatives
∂Rs
∂Ts
=


(1 + (Ts − t)(−
CB
θ¯Pd
))CB exp(−
CBTs
θ¯Pd
) Ts <
Pd
PA
Tr
(1 + (Ts − t)(−
CB
θ¯(Pd−PA)
))CB exp(−
CB(Ts−Tr)
θ¯(Pd−PA)
) Ts >
Pd
PA
Tr
We observe from (4) that the revenue is negative if Ts < t
and positive for Ts ≥ t, hence we can restrict our attention to
Ts ≥ t. In that region, each derivative is first strictly positive,
then null at one point, then strictly negative, hence:
• if t ≥ Pd
PA
Tr only the interval [t,+∞) needs to be
considered, and there is a unique revenue-maximizing
price t+(Pd−PA) θ¯CB given by the first-order condition(note that it is an interior solution in the interval).
• if t < Pd
PA
Tr, the revenue has a unique maximum on each
of the intervals [t, Pd
PA
Tr] and [ PdPATr,+∞):
– on the interval [t, Pd
PA
Tr], the optimal price is t +
Pd
θ¯
CB
if t + Pd θ¯CB ≤
Pd
PA
Tr (interior solution), and
Pd
PA
Tr otherwise (corner solution);
– on the interval [ Pd
PA
Tr,+∞], the optimal price is t+
(Pd−PA)
θ¯
CB
if t+(Pd−PA) θ¯CB ≥
Pd
PA
Tr (interior
solution), and Pd
PA
Tr otherwise (corner solution).
APPENDIX B
Proof:
In the first place, it is non-trivial to verify that (7) it is a
function, i.e.
∄Ts ∈ R≥0 : Ts ≤ −Er
Pd
PA
and Er,1(Ts) ≤ Er ≤ Er,2(Ts).
This is true because ∀Ts ∈ R≥0, we have 0 < Er,1(Ts) <
Er,2(Ts).
The R-charging station has nonnegative revenue when
−Er ≤ Tr ≤
PA
Pd
Ts from (6), so the following is a prerequi-
site:
Er ≥ −
PA
Pd
Ts
TABLE II: Solution of ∂Rr
∂Tr
= 0 in different circumstances
Conditions on Er
∂Rr
∂Tr Solution of ∂Rr
∂Tr
= 0 T brr
Tr = 0− Tr = 0+
Er <
θ¯PA
CB
Er < Er,2
Er,1 < Er > 0 < 0 None 0
Er ≤ Er,1 > 0 ≥ 0 ∈
[
0,min{ θ¯PA
CB
− Er,
PA
Pd
Ts}
)
The solution of ∂Rr
∂Tr
= 0
Er,2 ≤ Er ≤ 0 < 0 ∈ (−Er , 0] The solution of ∂Rr∂Tr = 0
θ¯PA
CB
≤ Er
Er < Er,2 > 0 < 0 None 0
Er,2 ≤ Er ≤ 0 < 0 ∈ (−Er , 0] The solution of ∂Rr∂Tr = 0
When this condition is not met, the R-charging station would
rather leave the market by setting a price sufficiently high i.e.
T brr ≥
PA
Pd
Ts such that no client would come.
If Er ≥ −PAPd Ts, and −Er ≤ Tr ≤
PA
Pd
Ts, we further
examine the partial derivative of the revenue function (6):
∂Rr
∂Tr
=


CB
(
1 − exp[−
CB(Ts − Tr)
θ¯(Pd − PA)
][1 +
CB (Tr + Er)
θ¯(Pd − PA)
]
)
if Tr < 0
CB{exp(−
CBTr
θ¯PA
)[1 −
CB (Tr + Er)
θ¯PA
]
− exp[−
CB (Ts − Tr)
θ¯(Pd − PA)
][1 +
CB (Tr + Er)
θ¯(Pd − PA)
]} if Tr > 0
(9a)
(9b)
(9c)
We begin with putting the boundaries of Tr into (9):
∂Rr
∂Tr
|Tr=−Er
> 0 if Er 6= 0
∂Rr
∂Tr
|
Tr=0−
> 0 ;
∂Rr
∂Tr
|
Tr=0+
> 0 if Er = 0
∂Rr
∂Tr
|
Tr=
PA
Pd
Ts
< 0.
(10)
(11)
(12)
Then within those bounds, we say (9) is strictly decreasing
on
(
min{0,−Er},max{0,min{
θ¯PA
CB
−Er,
PA
Pd
Ts}}
)
because:
• when Tr < 0, (9a) is strictly decreasing;
• when Tr > 0, noticing that (9b) is positive iff Tr <
θ¯PA
CB
− Er and is strictly decreasing when positive,
meanwhile (9c) is strictly decreasing and negative, ∂Rr
∂Tr
is strictly decreasing for Tr ∈ (0,max{0,min{ θ¯PACB −
Er,
PA
Pd
Ts}});
• when Tr = 0, ∂Rr∂Tr |Tr=0− >
∂Rr
∂Tr
|Tr=0+ .
From the monotony of ∂Rr
∂Tr
, we know that there is either
a unique solution of ∂Rr
∂Tr
= 0 or none. Table II summarizes
the conditions for each of them to occur, together with the
intervals wherein lies those possible solutions.
Jointly consider the first order optimality condition of
∂Rr
∂Tr
= 0 and the boundary values in (10) (11) and (12), we
conclude that Rr achieves the maximum either at the unique
solution of ∂Rr
∂Tr
= 0 (if it exist) or at Tr = 0, as stated in the
last column of table II, thus the optimality of the best-respond
price in (7) is proved.
APPENDIX C
Proof:
We prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equi-
librium through exhaustively combine (5a) (5b) (5c) and
(7a) (7b) (7c), in order to find possible intersections between
the two best-response prices.
First of all, (5b) can be easily excluded since according to
Proposition III.2, T brr (Ts) ≤ Ts PAPd , conflict with the condition
in (5b).
Then we check whether (5a) intersect with (7). Putting Ts =
t+ (Pd − PA)
θ¯
CB
into (7) gives:
Tbrr


=
(
t + (Pd − PA)
θ¯
CB
)PA
Pd
if t + (Pd − PA)
θ¯
CB
≤ −Er
Pd
PA
<
(
t + (Pd − PA)
θ¯
CB
)PA
Pd
otherwise.
(13a)
(13b)
Note that (13a) corresponds to the first case in (7) while (13b)
the rest. Comparing the values in (13a) with the condition
in (5a), we can further rule out the (5a)(7a) pair.
As a result, if −PA
Pd
[t + (Pd − PA)
θ¯
CB
] < Er, (5a) has an
intersection with (7), which provides a Nash equilibrium. De-
pending on the value of Er, the price profile of this equilibrium
falls in different segments, as expressed in (8b), (8c) and (8d).
Otherwise, when Er ≤ −PAPd [t + (Pd − PA)
θ¯
CB
], we end
up with infinite intersections between (5c) and (7a). Among
all the possible equilibria (Ts ≤ −Er PdPA , Tr = Ts PAPd ),
Ts = −Er
Pd
PA
, Tr = Ts
PA
Pd
Pareto dominates the rest because
the R-charging station is indifferent towards the choices of
Tr given Tr = Ts PAPd , whereas the S-charging station prefers
Ts = −Er
Pd
PA
rather than Ts < −Er PdPA . This preference is
from:
dRs(Tr = Ts
PA
Pd
)
dTs
|
Ts≤t+(Pd−PA)
θ¯
CB
> 0
The conditions for each equilibrium to occur are exclusive
and cover all possible circumstances.
